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Abstract
Many developing countries are actively seeking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) because 
it they enjoy the transfer of skills, knowledge, and capital. Multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are more likely to invest in countries with lower political risk. Knowing this, 
what forms of governance will help a country attract FDI by lowering its political risk? 
Will being a democracy help; will being federal help? This study attempts to add to 
inconclusive existing literature on this topic. It utilizes the governance classifications of 
71 countries made by Dr. Robert Inman’s in his paper “Federalism’s Values and the 
Value of Federalism”. Countries are classified as one of the following: constitutionally 
based federal democracy, an administratively based federal democracy, a unitary 
democracy, a federal dictatorship, or a unitary dictatorship. Then it studies the impact of 
the governance structures on the total investment in a country, the FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP, the net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, and the FDI inflows per 
capita in $US. The conclusions are as follows: 1) Democracy is the most importance 
governance factor in attracting greater FDI. 2) Federalism does not improve upon 
democracy in attracting more FDI. 3) Federalism does not help nondemocratic countries 
attract FDI. 4) Federalism is still important because it impacts economic rights, which in 
turn help attract greater FDI. 
______________________________
* Contact: aakashmadhu@gmail.com.  The author would like to thank Professor Robert 
Inman for graciously serving as my advisor throughout this project and patiently 
explaining ideas to me, Professor Martin Asher for coordinating the WRS program and 
providing useful comments and thoughts, and the entire WRS community for their input 
during our meetings and presentations. Any errors in this paper are solely mine.
Federalism’s Impact on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
Aakash Madhu Wharton Research Scholars 2
Introduction
Academics in a variety of disciplines proclaim numerous benefits to adopting a 
federal form of governance. Two sets of literature examine the importance of federalism; 
one group provides a theoretical framework for understanding the potential positive 
impacts of federalism and the other attempts to empirically study the relationships 
between federalism and proposed beneficial outcomes. “Federalism’s Values and the 
Value of Federalism” by Dr. Robert P. Inman, the advisor to this project, served as a 
starting point for understanding the empirical relationships between federalism and a 
number of beneficial outcomes that theory claims should exist. In particular, that study 
examined whether or not “federalism [serves] as a means to more efficient public and 
private economies, as the foundation for increased political participation and democratic 
stability and as an important check on governmental abuses of personal rights and 
liberties.”1 The results of the study will be discussed later in its relationship to this 
project. As this broad study indicates, academics often claim that federalism improves the 
performance of economies. This paper takes a much narrower approach towards 
understanding this relationship, and attempts to understand whether or not federalism 
contributes to increased amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Why should it be useful to understand the relationship between the form of 
governance and FDI? One answer would be that FDI is an essential factor for economic 
growth. This however is not a trivial claim because “[t]he role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the growth process has long been a topic of intense debate.”2
                                                
1 Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 
522-560.
2 Balasubramanyam, V.N., Salisu, M. & Sapsford, D. (1996) “Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in EP 
and IS Countries”, Economic Journal 106(1), 92-105.
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Nonetheless, there exists both theoretical and empirical research that argues the position 
that once a country attracts FDI, it experiences increased efficiency and growth. Despite 
the lack of resolution to this question, an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
federalism and FDI can serve useful since “many less developed countries (LDCs) have 
been actively seeking FDI inflows since the early 1980s, based on the belief that FDI can 
bring several benefits, including technology transfers, managerial skills and access to 
international markets.”3 Presumably, these countries will continue to seek FDI due to 
their assumptions about its benefits. Understanding how they can best achieve their 
desired results seems to be a reasonably useful exercise.
Theoretical Literature
In his paper “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development”, Barry Weingast provides much of the 
theoretical arguments for the hypothesis of this project. It examines the idea that 
historically, federalism played a critical role in the growth of numerous countries, 
including “England in the 18th century and the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries 
… [and also] China over the past 15 years.”4 The arguments he utilizes to justify his 
claims are worth exploring because the same theoretical arguments can help to justify the 
hypothesis made and to ultimately explore the meaning of the empirical results herein 
contained. 
The first step is to understand what Weingast defines as “Market-Preserving 
Federalism”. This paper attempts to contribute something to the understanding of this 
                                                
3 Yang, Benhua. (2007) “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries”, 
International Economic Journal 21(3), 419-439.
4 Weingast, Barry. (1995) “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and 
Economic Development”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1), 1-31. 
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classification also, as an aside to the primary hypothesis; this will be discussed later. 
Weingast establishes five criteria that classify a governance structure as market-
preserving federalism. They are the following:
(F1) A hierarchy of governments, that is, at least “two levels of governments rule 
the same land and people,” each with a delineated scope of authority so that each 
level of government is autonomous on its own, well-defined sphere of political 
authority.
(F2) The autonomy of each government is institutionalized in a manner that 
makes federalism’s restrictions self-enforcing.
(F3) Subnational governments have primary regulatory responsibility over the 
economy.
(F4) A common market is ensured, preventing the lower governments from using 
their regulatory authority to erect trade barriers against the goods and services 
from other political units.
(F5) The lower governments face a hard budget constraint, that is, they have 
neither the ability to print money nor access to unlimited credit. 5
Once these conditions are met, a number of consequences follow. Discussions on those 
relevant to the hypothesis of this paper follow. The first consequence described by 
Weingast is the “induced competition among lower units of the federal structure.”6 In 
thinking about this in context of a well known federal government, the United States, one 
can consider competition among states, which are lower units of the federal structure. 
States have autonomy in deciding numerous issues and thus can vary quite significantly 
                                                
5 Weingast, Barry. (1995) “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and 
Economic Development”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1), 1-31. 
6 Ibid.
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from each other in their legal and political environments. Due to conditions set out from 
market-preserving federalism, it follows that “political competition implies that 
jurisdictions must compete for capital, labor, and economic activity by offering menus of 
public policies (e.g., levels of taxation, security of private rights, social amenities, and 
public goods).”7 Those actors that seek to utilize these policies will choose the correct 
menu for them. 
The application to FDI follows in a relatively straight forward manner. First, 
assume that countries actively seek FDI. Although this paper does not focus on this issue, 
it cites Yang (2007), who claims that they do. Then assume that if the country as a whole 
seeks FDI due to some presupposed benefits, local entities would seek FDI for 
themselves to reap the benefits locally. This makes sense if one considers that managerial 
skill transfer and technological knowledge transfer are some of the assumed benefits; 
jurisdictions that obtain these would be more capable of competing with the other lower 
units. One can imagine that a particular set of menu choices regarding economic policies 
such as tax rates, operating rules and restrictions, labor laws, etc. would be optimal in 
attracting a multi-national corporation (MNC) to invest in that particular lower unit of the 
federal structure, whether it is a state or whatever else. Since competition exists, this 
menu of options would be more favorable to MNCs than a menu created by one entity, 
such as what would occur in a dictatorship for example. Consequently, MNCs would 
invest more in those jurisdictions with optimal menu options and therefore in countries 
with federal governance structures. 
Nathan Jensen, in his paper “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: 
Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment”, provides a separate 
                                                
7 Ibid.
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analysis that specifically tries to deduce why federalism should induce higher FDI. His 
discussion does not require market-preserving federalism; it analyzes the consequences of 
the larger set of governance of federalism which requires the (F1) and (F2) of Weingast’s 
criteria. The theoretical argument in his work does not rely on the concept of competition 
between lower units of governance for FDI. Instead it relies on the assumptions that 
MNCs base their decision to invest in particular countries for political reasons as well as 
economic ones; in particular, they would logically consider the political risks inherent in 
the country that could potentially hurt their bottom line. Jensen’s assumption is that 
“political institutions, specifically federal political systems, can lower political risk for 
investors by increasing the trustworthiness of government.”8
The analysis of how federal governments can lower political risk relies on the 
notion that the different levels of government (i.e. the federal government and the lower 
federal units) have veto power over each other on the economic issues that can influence 
the decisions of MNCs to invest. Notice that the existence of such veto powers is 
consistent with (F2) in Weingast’s definitions of federal governance. Suppose further that 
the goal of each political unit is to maximize its wealth. Given these assumptions, we can 
begin to understand the concerns that a MNC would have in investing in a particular 
country.
The most dramatic manner in which a foreign government can take advantage of 
an MNC’s invest is by nationalizing the company once the investment is made. In this 
way, the foreign government can “expropriate [the] assets or income streams”9 of the 
                                                
8 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
9 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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MNC. These types of nationalization occurred in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
Although they are no longer common, other risks that seriously affect the income of 
MNCs still exist. In particular, these risks include “defaulting on tax deals, restricting 
capital flows, defaulting on subsidies, etc.”10 One can also imagine that dramatic 
increases in the tax rate would take some of the income streams of the MNC. These 
considerations imply that political risks are real in terms of their impact on MNC incomes 
and thus are important factors in determining whether or not a particular foreign 
investment is a positive net present value (NPV) project or not. Lower political risk 
would make more foreign investments positive NPV projects and thus more investments 
will occur. 
In order to understand how the actions of federal government and unitary 
governments differ regarding whether or not to expropriate income streams from MNCs, 
it is necessary to delineate what factors influence their decisions. In order to simplify the 
rhetoric, this paper refers to these types of expropriations (i.e. nationalization, defaulting 
on tax deals, etc.) as reneging on the “contract” between the government and the MNC to 
protect the political policies that induced the MNC to invest in the first place. When 
deciding whether or not to renege, the government considers the benefits and the costs. 
The benefits are immediate increases in revenue for the government. Since decisions to 
invest are made repeatedly, the cost is the resultant reputational damage that will likely 
reduce the FDI inflows in the future. Situations in which the immediate benefits outweigh 
the long term costs as well as situations in which the long term reputational damage and 
decreased FDI inflows are worth more than the immediate revenue streams can both 
exist. Presuming rational actors make the decisions, the action with the highest NPV will 
                                                
10 Ibid.
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be chosen by the government. Although in unitary governments, these decisions can be 
based on such an analysis, the idea is that federal structures prevent governments form 
choosing to renege even if it is the more rational decision in terms of NPV.  If so doing, 
federal structures lower the risk that governments will renege regardless of their fiscal 
consideration. Thus, federalism instills confidence in the MNCs related to their 
assumptions about their income streams and thereby encourages investment.
Jensen and McGillivray amalgamate the existing literature (which includes 
Weingast’s work) into a cohesive theory explaining how federalism is more effective 
than other governance structure in preventing reneging on contracts.11 Instead of 
summarizing their theory and risking losing key elements, the following is a direct quote 
of an example from their paper that explains the most relevant ideas. 
Consider a foreign investor contemplating investing capital in a factory overseas. 
Suppose the foreign investor negotiates a contract to build a factory with a foreign 
government… [B]y defecting today, the government foregoes future benefits form 
FDI. However, the government wants to stay in power today. It values the short-
term political benefits of defecting over higher long-term levels of FDI. In this 
kind of scenario, we expect the government to engage in creeping expropriation 
up to the point where the foreign firm is indifferent between remaining in the host 
country and relocating its factory elsewhere.
Suppose next that the host country is a federal political system with three 
states, A, B, C. Any two of these three state governments can veto the federal 
government’s policy proposals. The federal government can veto the policy 
initiatives of any individual state government. Legislation relating to FDI requires 
the agreement of both the state and federal governments. Both the state and the 
federal governments benefit from FDI (via federal and local taxes, local 
employment, etc.).
Suppose that the state government reneges on the contract with the foreign 
investor by demanding higher local taxes. The state reaps the benefits from 
defaulting. For the government, these short-term benefits outweigh the damage to 
their reputation and the loss of future FDI. However, reneging damages the 
reputation of both the federal and the state government. The federal government 
gets none of the short-term political benefits but shares the reputational costs (less 
                                                
11 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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future investment for the nation). It has an incentive to intervene to prevent the 
state government from defaulting. One could argue that since it is the state that 
defaults and not the federal government, this will not damage the federal 
government’s reputation. However, by not stepping in to prevent the state from 
defaulting, the federal government’s reputation is harmed.
Suppose next that the federal government reneges by demanding higher 
federal taxes from the foreign investor’s factory, located in state A. If the federal 
government reneges on the contract, it reaps all of the benefits. In this case, the 
short-term benefits of reneging outweigh the long-term cost in lost future 
investment. State A does not share in the short-term benefits; rather its reputation 
is damaged because it could not prevent the federal government from defaulting. 
Indeed, the reputational costs are shared by all the states. If the federal 
government steals in one state, it harms future investment in other states. States 
have incentives to cooperate in preventing the federal government from reneging 
on FDI contracts. In this way, state governments act as a restraint on the federal 
government.
How do these arguments for federal systems compare with the case for 
unitary systems? Suppose that a particular country is unitary in structure. FDI 
contracts need only the approval of the central government. The central 
government reaps all of the benefits from FDI (some of which it distributes to 
local governments). The only constraint on the central government is the damage 
reneging does to its own reputation. However, as discussed earlier, the immediate 
political benefits from reneging often outweigh long-term economic costs. The 
pure reputational argument is not as powerful a constraint on the central 
government as is the state veto in federal systems, where because of joint 
reputation accountability, the federal government is prevented from reneging by a 
majority of states. 
…
In summary … we should expect federal systems to attract more FDI than unitary
systems.12
Given these strong theoretical arguments, the expectation is that empirically, 
federal governments attract higher levels of FDI as a percentage of GDP. However, there 
are other arguments within the literature that do not agree with the logic described above. 
Thus, there is ambiguity in the theory that needs to be resolved empirically.
In their paper, “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?”, Jonathan Rodden and Susan 
Rose-Ackerman argue against Weingast’s theory that market-preserving federalism has 
the positive outcomes as described above. Instead, they theorize that the effect can be the 
                                                
12 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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exact opposite of what Weingast (and Jensen essentially) propose as the consequences of 
federalism. In reference to the notion that competition between lower level political units 
encourages the creation of the optimal menu of policy choices, they retort that 
“intergovernmental competition may not force subnational politicians to make efficient 
policies, and in fact the decentralization of authority that is necessary to bring about 
competition may introduce significant costs.”13
Their conclusions can be applied to the relationship between federalism and FDI 
specifically very naturally. The assumption was that if a particular country, and lower 
political units within that country, was seeking FDI inflows, the competition described 
would result in the optimal political atmosphere to attract that FDI. If however, the switch 
from no policy decentralization to significant policy decentralization (enough to make the 
competition viable and effective) has immense costs associated with it, the analysis of the 
government when deciding to renege may be very different. Suppose that a country is a 
dictatorship and its sole goal is to attract FDI. It knows that changing its governance 
structure by introducing policy decentralization will result in increased FDI (assume this 
is the result that this study finds). However, the government undergoes tremendous costs 
in creating the system that will be necessary. The government will only go through with 
the transition if the present value of the increase in FDI is greater than the present value 
of the costs that will be incurred. Even if the FDI inflow increase is enormous, it may not 
be rational to change governance structures in certain cases. Thus, the theory does not 
provide us with an answer here; the costs may vary significantly from country to country.
                                                
13 Rodden, Jonathan and Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1997) “Does Federalism Preserve Markets”, Virginia 
Law Review 83, 1521-1572. 
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The author contributes one additional theoretical problem with applying Weingast 
to this particular study. Although competition may induce the “optimal menu of policies”, 
this optimal menu requires compromises on certain goals to achieve other more important 
goals. Although countries actively seek FDI, that may not be the highest priority of the 
countries nor of the lower political units. The optimal menu may sacrifice the structures 
and policies to attract the highest amounts of FDI. Thus, even if Weingast is correct in his 
analysis and conclusions, it does not imply that federalist countries necessary have higher 
amount so FDI; it certainly does imply that they have the highest capacity to do so 
however since if it was the top priority the analysis given previously applies. We assume 
in this paper that since FDI has such tremendous exogenous benefits such as technology 
transfer and the transfer of managerial knowledge that for most countries it would be a 
reasonably high enough priority to warrant attention and therefore, Weingast’s ideas 
should be reflected in the data.
Empirical Literature
The question studied by this project has been explored before; the results have 
been varied and no decisive conclusion has been reached. In fact, the results are varied 
not only regarding federalism’s impact on FDI, but on democracy’s impact on FDI as 
well. This study attempts to answer both questions. 
Benhua Yang, in his paper “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the 
Developing Countries”, describes the existing literature on these topics in the following 
way: From 1983-1992 autocracies seemed to attract the highest levels of FDI and from 
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1993-2002 democracies seem to do so.14 He also finds, as does the author of this paper, 
that the existing theoretical and empirical literature is insufficient to answer the question 
one way or the other. Regarding the relationship between democracy and FDI, he writes 
that “some authors (e.g. Li & Resnick, 2003, Jensen, 2003) argue that democracy 
promotes FDI inflows by providing better property rights protection, others (O’Donnell, 
1978; Haggard, 1990; Greider, 1998) argue that FDI favors autocracy for reasons such as 
its capacity to suppress labor demands, repress against protestors, and offer tax incentives 
to the advantage of multinational corporations (MNCs).”15 Moreover, he writes that “the 
provision of effective property rights protection and contract enforcement by a 
democracy will promote FDI inflows (Li & Resnick 2003, Jensen, 2003). Similarly, 
Henisz (2000) argues that the higher number of veto players in the democratic system 
places constraints on policy changes and hence helps attract FDI.”16
This analysis extends naturally to the argument that federalism promotes FDI 
inflows. The theoretical literature supporting why this should be the case relies heavily on 
the concepts that argue democracy should promote FDI. In effect, democracy serves a 
similar purpose as federalism – as a thought experiment we assume they are mutually 
exclusive. Democracy lowers political risk by increasing rights protections and 
federalism does the same thing. Thus both should attract higher levels of FDI. However, 
as Yang shows, the existing empirical literature does not show this result to be the clear 
answer. Yang adds to the discussion by concluding that there is no “systematic 
                                                
14 Yang, Benhua. (2007) “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries”, 
International Economic Journal 21(3), 419-439.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. This result suggests that being a 
democracy does not help attract higher levels of FDI.”17
Jensen and McGillivray come to exactly the opposite conclusion as Yang. In 
particular, they find that “both democratic and federal countries attract higher levels of 
FDI. Both institutions help lower political risk. The additive effect of combining 
federalism and democracy, however, is small. As we suspected, democratic countries are 
already regarded as trustworthy, so the additional credibility provided by federalism has 
little effect on FDI. However, federalism has a strong effect on the integrity of 
nondemocratic countries. All else equal, federal nondemocratic countries attract some of 
the highest levels of FDI.”18
As has been shown through reviewing the existing literature, both the theoretical 
and empirical work that has been done has shown opposing results. Thus, looking at the 
literature in existence, we cannot come to a conclusion about the effects of democracy or 
federalism. Thus, this paper seeks to contribute another study to this body of literature 
and hopefully add additional support to one of the conclusions that has already been 
reached. It makes improvements on some of the methodology; most notably this occurs in 
the classifications of the countries that is taken from Dr. Inman’s work. 
Definitions
Foreign Direct Investment
The first important term that requires definition is Foreign Direct Investment, or 
FDI. It is important to know that FDI is not the same as portfolio investment, such as that 
                                                
17 Ibid.
18 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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make in stocks or bonds abroad. It specifically refers to investment in real operations 
(e.g. capital expenditures on fixed assets).19 An even more precise definition defines FDI 
to “an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the 
economy of the investor.”20 Moreover, “[t]he most important characteristic of FDI, which 
distinguishes it from foreign portfolio investment, is that it is undertaken with the 
intention of exercising control over an enterprise.”21 The importance then of studying 
FDI, versus studying portfolio investment for instance, is that when a multi-national 
corporation exercises control over a foreign enterprise it directly transfers managerial and 
other business skills to the local employees of that operation. This transfer of information 
can have a significant multiplier effect since the employees can apply these skills in other 
situations. Thus, these transfers of knowledge and skills eventually can lead to growth for 
the country. This combination of capital, tangible knowledge and skills, and direct 
creation of jobs is what makes FDI particularly special, and much more coveted than 
simple portfolio investment. 
As can be deduced by the effects that FDI can have, it is most important for 
developing nations as they are the ones that desire the transfers of skills. Thus, given our 
theoretical discussions, we must keep in mind that their may be differences on how 
actively certain countries seek FDI. If we rely on the explanation that local political units 
seek FDI by creating the correct menu of policies, then the notion that countries seek FDI 
with different degrees of tenacity (which is based on the development of the country) 
throws a kink into that logic. Nonetheless, we have discussed Jensen’s joint argument 
which relies both on this notion of competition and reputational arguments. Thus, there 
                                                
19 Source: World Bank.
20 Source: World Bank, www.UNCTAD.org
21 Ibid.
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exist various theoretical explanations that can fit our model of the world even if we 
change the assumptions (e.g. from everyone seeking FDI actively to different degrees of 
tenacity in seeking FDI).
Forms of Governance
The precise definition of market-preserving federalism based on Weingast’s work 
is provided in the “Theoretical Literature” section. However, the classifications in this 
paper are slightly different (Weingast was simply used to provide theoretical context that 
is still relevant as many countries we classify as federal fit his definition of market-
preserving federal governments). The classifications of the forms of governance are 
based on those classifications used by Dr. Inman in his paper “Federalism’s Values and 
the Value of Federalism”. He relies on William Riker’s definition of federalism which is 
“(A) political organization in which the activities of government are divided between 
regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of 
government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.”22 Essentially, this 
requires (F1) and (F2) in Weingast’s definitions and (F3), (F4), and (F5) may or may not 
hold true. 
One of the improvements that this paper makes on much of the existing literature 
is that it utilizes categorical measures for the form of governance (adapted from Dr. 
Inman’s work) instead of using a scale of democracy or federalism. Much of the existing 
literature tries to rank countries how democratic and how federal they are. This study 
does not that; it simply classifies countries into particular categories of governance. In so 
                                                
22 Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 
522-560.
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doing, it seeks to answer whether or not instituting the basic structures of particular types 
of governance types makes a difference in attracting FDI inflows. The following is taken 
from Dr. Inman, the advisor to this project:
[The following table, Table 1] classifies each of the 73 countries included in this 
study as either a federal democracy (denoted FED/DEM = 1in the empirical 
analysis), a unitary democracy without significant policy decentralization called 
an administratively federal democracy [ADMFED/DEM = 1] a unitary democracy 
without policy decentralization called simply a unitary democracy (UNT/DEM = 
1), a federal dictatorship (FED/DICT = 1), or a unitary dictatorship (UNT/DICT = 
1).23
See Table on the next page.
The difference between being FEDDEM and ADMFEDDEM is that FEDDEM refers to 
constitutionally federal governments where are ADMFEDDEM refers to de facto federal 
governments that are determined based on the amount of local government revenue as a 
percentage of total government revenue (See Inman (2007) for more details). A federal 
dictatorship essentially has some policy decentralization where as a unitary dictatorship 
does not.
                                                
23 Ibid.
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Table 1
Form of 
Governance
Number of 
Provinces (N )       
N=1 if  Unitary
Form of 
Governance
Number of 
Provinces (N )       
N=1 if  Unitary
Federal/Democracy Mean = 20.3
Administrative 
Federal/Democracy Mean = 9.6
(FED/DEM = 1) (AFED/DEM = 1)
Argentina 23 Denmark 1
Australia 7 Finland 1
Austria 9 France 1
Belgium 3 Italy 22
Brazil 27 Japan 47
Canada 10 Netherlands 11
Colombia 27 Norway 1
Germany 16 Sweden 1
India 25 Uruguay 1
Spain 17
Switzerland 26
United States 51
Venezuela 24
Unitary/Democracy Mean = 2.4
Federal/ 
Dictatorship Mean = 18.6
(UNT/DEM = 1) (FED/DICT = 1)
Bangladesh 1 Comoros 3
Chile 1 Czechoslovakia 2
Ecuador 1 Ethiopia 10
Greece 1 Malaysia 13
Guatemala 1 Mexico 32
Iceland 1 Nigeria 37
Ireland 1 Pakistan 4
Jamaica 1 Russia 89
Luxenbourg 1 Tanzania 2
Mauritius 1 United Arab Emirates 7
New Zealand 1 Yugoslavia 6
Papua New Guinea 20
Peru 1
Philippines 1
Portugal 2
United Kingdom 4
Unitary/Dictatorship Mean = 4.7
(UNT/DICT = 1)
Algeria 1
Bolivia 1
Botswana 1
Bulgaria 1
Cameroon 10
China 28
Dominican Republic 1
El Salvador 1
Ghana 10
Honduras 1
Indonesia 27
Korea 1
Myanmar 7
Nicaragua 1
Panama 1
Paraguay 1
Sierra Leone 1
South Africa 9
Sudan 1
Thailand 1
Tunisia 1
Vietnam 1
Zambia 1
Zimbabwe 1
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Hypothesis
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature as a whole couple with intuition, 
the hypothesis is as follows:
1) Democracy should result in higher levels of FDI because it lowers political 
risk.
2) Federalism should result in higher levels of FDI (even on top of democracy) 
because it lowers political risk even more and it have the positive outcomes of 
competition between lower level political units and a joint-reputational set-up 
between the central and local governments.
Empirical Analysis
The analysis studies the impact of the form of governance on four dependent 
variables related to FDI. The time period over which these variables are studied is from 
1970-1998 and although 73 countries were originally selected for the study as shown 
above, ultimately 71 yielded sufficient enough results to be included (Myanmar and 
Yugoslavia were excluded). The way in which the dependent variables are treated differs 
from the way they are treated in much of the existing literature; the author believes this is 
another area in which this study improves upon previous ones. Previous work looks at 
each year as a data point and studies the effects over time. This paper looks at the average 
of the 1970-1998 time period instead because the author believes an average can more 
effectively answer the question at hand. Once a country becomes a democracy or a 
institutes enough policy decentralization to be considered federal, the hypothesis assumes 
that the FDI should increase. If two countries are federal and FDI for one of them 
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increases over time and FDI does not increase for the other, then the increase must be due 
to some other factor than its form of governance. Thus, a study that analyses the data on a 
yearly basis incorporates changes in FDI caused by other factors.
The four dependent variables are Total Investment (CI7098), FDI inflow as a 
percentage of GDP (PCTFDI7098), Net FDI (i.e. FDI inflows – outflows) as a percentage 
of GDP (FDINET7098), and FDI inflow per capita (FDIPC7098). 
Total investment is a measure taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) database 
version 6.2. The variable is defined as the Investment Share of CGDP, where CGDP is 
the Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita. The number associated with each country 
is a percentage. An entry of “10.0” means that total investment (per capita of course) is 
10% of CGDP. The purpose of this variable is simply to see of governance impacts 
investment overall. This seems to be just as interesting of a question as whether or not it 
impacts FDI in particular.
FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP utilizes two sources of data. The FDI inflow 
data (in $US) comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The GDP is calculated 
using data from PWT using the variables CGDP and population. The purpose of studying 
FDI as a percentage of GDP instead of the level of FDI is to eliminate the effect of the 
size of the economy. Smaller economies will naturally have smaller levels of FDI inflow, 
but that does not necessarily mean that they don’t have favorable policies toward FDI. As 
a percentage of the size of their economy, FDI may still contribute an enormous amount 
of capital. Net FDI as a percentage of GDP essentially does the same thing as 
FDIPCT7098, but it looks at the FDI inflows minus the FDI outflows (both from the 
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IMF) as a percentage of GDP. Essentially, this variable enables to see whether or not 
democracies and federal governments seem to be capital importers and exporters. 
FDI inflow per capita just takes the FDI inflow data from the IMF and divides by 
the population from PWT. The purpose of this is exactly the same as FDIPCT7098 but it 
simply provides a different technique for studying FDI while eliminating the effects of 
the size of the market. It simply eliminates the effect of size of the country in a different 
way; the expectation is that the results should be very similar given either variable.
The independent variables are the forms of governance taken from Dr. Inman. 
They are described in detail in the “Forms of Governance” section in the “Definitions” 
section. There are five variables; they are FEDDEM, ADMFEDDEM, UNTDEM, 
FEDDICT, and UNTDICT. In the data, a 1 is assigned to the category under which the 
country falls and a 0 is assigned to the rest of the variables. In the analysis, when 
studying the effect of democracy on our dependent variables, we create an additional 
variable called DEM. DEM = FEDDEM + ADMFEDDEM + UNTDEM. Similarly, when 
studying the effects of federalism we look at a new variable ALLFEDDEM = FEDDEM 
+ ADMFEDDEM. 
Later in the paper, in order to make sense of the results that follow, another 
independent variable called HJGADP is introduced. This variable is essentially a measure 
of economic rights on a scale from 0-1. More formally it is the following:
The Hall-Jones index of government anti-diversion policies, created for the years 
1986-1995 as a measure of a government’s enforcement of law and order and 
control of corruption (scaled from 0-1, higher score representing policies 
supportive of private economic activity). Mean = 0.66 (S.D. = 0.21) Source: Hall 
and Jones (1999).24
                                                
24 Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 
522-560.
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Dependent Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CI7098 71 18.70 7.83 3.74 34.45
PCTFDI7098 71 0.62 0.58 0.00 2.64
FDINET7098 71 0.17 0.67 (1.90) 1.99
FDIPC7098 70 62.75 94.68 0.00 457.87
This is an important variable because of it impacts our dependent variables quite 
significantly, and it explains something about federalism’s impact.
In terms of controls, various variables were considered. These include GDP, GDP 
per capita, growth rate, trade openness, infrastructure, legal origin, and market based vs. 
bank based capital market structures. In the various regressions that were ran and 
analyzed different sets of controls were used. Ultimately however, this added levels of 
complexity beyond the scope of this paper in terms of many of the theoretical 
implications. Thus, the main control that was utilized in performing the analysis whose 
resulted are presented here was a variable called ABSLAT, which is the absolute latitude 
from the equator. This is an effective control variable because it captures a lot of the 
differences in history between countries that have led to their level of economic 
development. Dr. Inman writes that ABSLAT “serves as a control for the country’s 
location and climate and has proven to be an important fundamental determinant of 
economic growth, incomes and a country’s colonial legacies”.25
The following tables give summary statistics for the variables described within 
this section. The purpose of these is to get a general sense of the data looks like.
Table 2:
This table informs us that on average, total investment in a country is about 18.70% of its
GDP, FDI inflows are about 0.62% of GDP, FDI net inflows are about 0.17% of GDP 
                                                
25 Ibid.
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Dependent Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CI7098 33 15.29 7.95 3.74 33.12
PCTFDI7098 33 0.41 0.43 0.00 1.92
FDINET7098 33 0.29 0.61 (1.79) 1.99
FDIPC7098 33 12.42 19.77 0.00 96.38
(and that on average countries are importers of FDI since a negative number indicates 
they are an exporter of FDI), and that FDI per capita is $62.75. 
Table 3:
This table is the same as before except all of the democracies have been removed (recall 
the DEM variable defined previously). It seems that most dependent variables fall (18.70 
 15.29, 0.62  0.41, 62.75  12.42). The objective of running the regressions we do is
to see if these reductions are actually statistically significant. 
Table 4:
Form of Governance PCTFDI7098 FDINET7098 FDIPC7098 CI7098
FEDDEM AVG 0.84 0.14 121.37 22.26
FEDDEM STDEV 0.71 0.64 126.51 5.39
UNTDEM AVG 0.81 0.47 77.95 17.13
UNTDEM STDEV 0.67 0.61 97.84 5.96
ADMFEDDEM AVG 0.75 (0.43) 122.49 25.90
ADMFEDDEM STDEV 0.56 0.63 110.68 5.13
FEDDICT AVG 0.44 0.14 17.41 15.31
FEDDICT STDEV 0.60 0.84 31.02 7.69
UNTDICT AVG 0.39 0.35 10.25 15.29
UNTDICT STDEV 0.35 0.48 12.60 8.23
Table 4 shows very simple averages and standard deviations for each dependent variable, 
categorized by the independent variables. Since this initial quick and dirty analysis seems 
interesting (as we see that Dictatorships have much lower averages than the others), we 
expect the regression analysis to tell us a story somewhat consistent with the hypothesis.
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Empirical Analysis Results
The results of the regressions are provided in the following tables along with 
basic interpretations. The “Conclusion” section fits these interpretations in with the 
theoretical analysis provided earlier and it attempts to understand the implications of the 
results. 
See tables 5, 6, and 7 below.
Table 5:
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Variable of 
Interest (VoI)
Coefficient 
of VoI P > |t| R-squared
CI7098 ABSLAT DEM DEM 2.698 0.115 0.372
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT DEM DEM 0.295 0.048 0.143
FDINET7098 ABSLAT DEM DEM 0.013 0.939 0.132
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT DEM DEM 56.289 0.005 0.422
CI7098 ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 1.729 0.427 0.378
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.081 0.671 0.145
FDINET7098 ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.059 0.789 0.133
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 28.658 0.259 0.434
CI7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM ALLFEDDEM 4.665 0.035 0.413
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM ALLFEDDEM (0.082) 0.675 0.145
FDINET7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM ALLFEDDEM (0.471) 0.034 0.189
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM ALLFEDDEM 13.595 0.614 0.425
CI7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM FEDDEM (1.165) 0.649 0.415
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.181 0.429 0.153
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM FEDDEM 31.016 0.311 0.434
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Table 6:
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Variable of 
Interest (VoI)
Coefficient 
of VoI P > |t| R-squared
CI7098 ABSLAT FEDDICT FEDDICT (0.227) 0.939 0.102
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT FEDDICT FEDDICT 0.061 0.716 0.046
FDINET7098 ABSLAT FEDDICT FEDDICT (0.196) 0.403 0.055
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT FEDDICT FEDDICT 7.491 0.327 0.057
CI7098 ABSLAT FEDDEM FEDDEM 1.807 0.289 0.461
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.104 0.623 0.128
FDINET7098 ABSLAT FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.048 0.834 0.175
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT FEDDEM FEDDEM 33.022 0.292 0.395
All Democracies Dropped (FEDDICT AND UNTDICT LEFT)
All Dictatorships Dropped (FEDDEM, ADMFEDDEM, AND UNTDEM LEFT)
Table 7:
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Variable of 
Interest (VoI)
Coefficient 
of VoI P > |t| R-squared
HJGADP ABSLAT FEDDEM FEDDEM 0.127 0.003 0.630
HJGADP ABSLAT FEDDEM DEM FEDDEM 0.075 0.088 0.667
HJGADP ABSLAT FEDDEM DEM DEM 0.101 0.008 0.667
CI7098 ABSLAT HJGADP HJGADP 23.234 0.000 0.498
PCTFDI7098 ABSLAT HJGADP HJGADP 1.874 0.000 0.273
FDINET7098 ABSLAT HJGADP HJGADP 0.251 0.665 0.131
FDIPC7098 ABSLAT HJGADP HJGADP 303.116 0.000 0.527
The first part of Table 5 shows that being a democracy is correlated with higher 
levels of total investment and FDI inflows. For this type of analysis, an R2 of over 0.300 
is reasonable and we achieve values beyond that threshold for CI7098 and for 
FDIPC7098. The most relevant dependent variable is PCTFDI7098 and we see that the 
coefficient of DEM in this regression is 0.295%. Thus, this regression tells us that being a 
democracy increase FDI inflows to a country by 0.295% of GDP. 
The second part of Table 5 seeks to understand the additive effective of being a 
federal democracy once a country is already a democracy. Thus, it seeks to answer the 
question: How does adding federalism on an existing democracy impact FDI? Looking at 
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all four regressions, the results show that there is no statistically significant impact of 
federalism on FDI once a country is a democracy. The third part of Table 5 answers 
essentially the same question as the second part; the difference is that it includes 
administratively federal democracies along with federal democracies. An administrative 
federal democracy is essentially “de facto” federal. The exact methodology to determine 
what makes it “de facto” federal is based on the percentage of total government revenues 
coming from local governments. The data indicates that being either type of federal, “de 
facto” or constitutionally federal does improve upon total investment. Furthermore, it 
indicates that countries that can be classified in ALLFEDDEM tend to be exporters rather 
than importers of capital. This makes sense considering our intuition that countries such 
as the United States, Australia, and Germany tend to be capital exporters rather than 
importers. Nonetheless, this regression fails to tell us what we thought we would hear; 
Federalism seems not to help attract FDI inflows for an existing democracy. 
Part four looks at whether or not being specifically federal (constitutionally as 
opposed to “de facto”) impacts FDI in any way. There is no statistically significant 
difference between the two. 
Table 6 attempts to isolate the effects of federalism from democracy. The idea is 
that even if we do not see federalism improving upon democracy in the overall data, 
perhaps adding federal structures (i.e. policy decentralization and the other criterion from 
Weingast’s analysis) helps non-democracies (i.e. dictatorships). Surprisingly, adding 
policy decentralization to a non-democracy does nothing to help any of our dependent 
variables! This result helps us to understand the essential role of democracy in attracting 
FDI and total investment. A similar attempt to isolate the effects of federalism is 
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presented in part 2 of Table 6. The data shows that once you consider all democracies, 
being federal in addition to being democratic does not help you attract FDI.
Finally, Table 7 studies the effects of the variable HJGADP, which quantifies the 
economic rights of a country. This part of the analysis is where we see a lot of interesting 
and exciting results. The first part of the table shows that federalism positively impacts 
HJGADP (this is a similar result to Inman’s) and with an R2 = 0.630, we can be confident 
that this regression explains federalism’s impact of HJGADP well. Secondly, we learn 
that being a democracy plays, like being federal, plays a key role in determining a 
countries economic rights. Democracy actually plays a more important role than 
federalism, since it has a coefficient of 0.101 (on a 0-1 Scale variable) and federalism has 
a 0.075 coefficient. 
The last part of Table 7 explains a lot about our dependent variables. It indicates 
that HJGADP is very important in determining CI7098, PCTFDI7098, and FDIPC7098. 
It has a coefficient of 23.234 when regressed on CI7098 (mean = 18.699), 1.874 on 
PCTFDI7098 (mean = 0.617), and 303.116 on FDIPC7098 (mean = 62.754). HJGADP
has quite a large impact!
Conclusion
Before reaching conclusions based on the simple statistics used in this study, it is 
important to acknowledge that numerous other factors can impact the dependent 
variables. These can include a country’s legal origins, culture, goals, development stage, 
etc. Our research does not account for not explain the implications of all of these other 
possible factors, as such a comprehensive analysis is far beyond the scope and objective 
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of this paper. The conclusions drawn here ignore these other effects and leave the 
understanding of the other variables up to future studies. 
As discussed in the literature review, a MNC’s decision to invest in a particular 
foreign country depends heavily on the level of political risk present in that nation. We 
expected that both democracy and federalism (although federalism was the primary focus 
of this study) would lower the political risk of a country and thereby attract higher levels 
of investment (both total and FDI inflows). (1) The first conclusion we can draw from the 
results is that democracy certainly does impact our dependent variables; it’s coefficient 
on total investment (CI7098) is 2.698 (mean = 18.699), on FDI inflows as a percentage of 
GDP (PCTFDI7098) is 0.295 (mean = 0.617), and on FDI per capita (FDIPC7098) is 
56.289 (mean = 62.754). Thus, democracy seems to lower a government’s political risk 
and this in turn encourages FDI inflows. 
(2) The second conclusion, which contradicts our intuition and expectations from 
the theoretical literature, is the federalism does not add much to democracy in terms of 
lowering political risk more to attract even higher levels of FDI inflows. This result is 
consistent with Jensen and McGillvray’s findings. They find the following:
The additive effective of combining federalism and democracy … is small. As we 
suspected, democratic countries are already regarded as trustworthy, so the 
additional credibility provided by federalism has little effect on FDI.26
We find the same result, which is evident from the regression summaries in Table 5. 
(3) The third conclusion we draw is that federalism does not help nondemocratic 
countries attract higher levels of FDI. This result can be seen from the regression 
                                                
26 Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, 
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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summaries in Table 6. This result contradicts the findings of Jensen and McGillvray, who 
found that “federalism has a strong effect on the integrity of nondemocratic countries”.27
Our results show that democracy matters most and that federalism without democracy 
does not do anything to increase investor confidence. This is not entirely surprising based 
on Weingast’s work. (F2), one of the criteria for being federal, states that “the autonomy
of each government [must be] institutionalized in a manner that makes federalism’s 
restrictions self-enforcing”. It seems natural to assume that democracy provides the 
structure to make these restrictions self-enforcing. Without democracy, the federal 
structures do not hold as much weight; thus, investors do not have the confidence in these 
nondemocractic federal nations as they do in democratic countries.
It seems at odds with the theoretical literature that federalism has absolutely no 
impact on FDI inflows (via political risk) above and beyond the impact of democracy. Is 
our analysis and application of Weingast, Inman, etc. incorrect? This may not necessarily 
be the case. Table 7, in which we introduce HJGADP may provide some explanation as 
to what federalism does contribute above and beyond democracy. See Figure A, which is 
a short version of one created by Inman, and changed slightly to make it relevant to this 
study:28
Figure A shows that both democracy and federalism contribute to economic rights 
(HJGADP). Then economic rights contribute to the dependent variables we studied (FDI 
inflows importantly). (4) The fourth conclusion is that this impact on economic rights is 
federalism’s unique contribution toward attraction of FDI above and beyond what
democracy alone can do. Federalism enhances those property rights that lower the 
                                                
27 Ibid.
28 Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 
522-560.
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political risk of a country and thereby attract FDI. Although this manner of looking at the 
situation provides some insight, it also adds confusion. Presumably, we should see this 
effect directly; federalism should directly impact FDI as well by transitivity. Despite 
effort, the author is unable to untangle the effects and understand why one impact is 
present and the other is not. Plausibly, if economic rights consist of a variety of factors, 
federalism contributes to those factors that have less to do with FDI than democracy 
does. This is speculative however and does not sufficiently satisfy the confusion. We 
leave the untangling of this confusion to future research. 
Ultimately, this paper finds that if a country wants to attract FDI, regardless of the
merits of the arguments claiming that it promotes economic growth, it needs to become a 
democracy. Becoming a democracy makes the country a safer place to invest for MNCs 
because it lowers the political risks of nationalization and the enactment of unfavorable 
legislation. Additionally, going one step further and becoming a federalist democracy 
(either constitutionally or “de facto”, the study finds no statistically significant difference 
between the two) will help increase its economic rights and these in turn will attract FDI. 
Thus the empirical analysis seems to validate the theoretical research, but some 
surprising results do emerge.
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Federal Constitution
DEMocratic FEDeralismDEMocracy
0.22
(0.05)*
N
0.007
(0.001)*
R
0.03
(0.04)
LOCal REVenue
0.40
(0.14)*
Economic (HJGADP) Rights
CI7098 PCTFDI7098 FDIPC7098
23.23
(0.00)*
1.87
(0.00)*
303.12
(0.00)*
Figure A
Note: * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher.
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